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Essay
SLUDGE AND ORDEALS
CASS R. SUNSTEIN†
ABSTRACT
Is there an argument for behaviorally informed deregulation? In
2015, the United States government imposed 9.78 billion hours of
paperwork burdens on the American people. Many of these hours are
best categorized as “sludge,” understood as friction, reducing access to
important licenses, programs, and benefits. Because of the sheer costs
of sludge, rational people are effectively denied life-changing goods
and services. The problem is compounded by the existence of
behavioral biases, including inertia, present bias, and unrealistic
optimism. A serious deregulatory effort should be undertaken to
reduce sludge through automatic enrollment, greatly simplified forms,
and reminders. At the same time, sludge can promote legitimate goals.
First, it can protect program integrity, which means that policymakers
might have to make difficult tradeoffs between (1) granting benefits to
people who are not entitled to them and (2) denying benefits to people
who are entitled to them. Second, it can overcome impulsivity,
recklessness, and self-control problems. Third, it can prevent intrusions
on privacy. Fourth, it can serve as a rationing device, ensuring that
benefits go to people who most need them. Fifth, it can help public
officials to acquire valuable information, which they can use for
important purposes. In most cases, however, these defenses of sludge
turn out to be far more attractive in principle than in practice. For
sludge, a form of cost-benefit analysis is essential, and it will often
demonstrate the need for a neglected form of deregulation: sludge
reduction. For both public and private institutions, “Sludge Audits”
should become routine, and they should provide a foundation for
behaviorally informed deregulation. Various suggestions are offered
for new action by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
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which oversees the Paperwork Reduction Act; for courts; and for
Congress.
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I. 9.78 BILLION HOURS
Enacted in 1979, the Paperwork Reduction Act (“PRA”)1 was
meant to be a deregulatory statute. It was designed to minimize the
paperwork burden imposed on the American people and to maximize
the benefit of the information obtained. Its key provision states:
With respect to the collection of information and the control of
paperwork, the Director [of the Office of Management and Budget]
shall—
(1) review and approve proposed agency collections of
information
(2) coordinate the review of the collection of information
associated with Federal procurement and acquisition by the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs with the Office of
1. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163 (codified as amended
at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521 (2012)).
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Federal Procurement Policy, with particular emphasis on applying
information technology to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of Federal procurement, acquisition and payment,
and to reduce information collection burdens on the public;
(3) minimize the Federal information collection burden,
with particular emphasis on those individuals and entities most
adversely affected;
(4) maximize the practical utility of and public benefit
from information collected by or for the Federal Government; and
(5) establish and oversee standards and guidelines by
which agencies are to estimate the burden to comply with a
proposed collection of information.2

For present purposes, the most important provisions are (3) and
(4). The word “minimize” suggests that paperwork burdens should be
no greater than necessary to promote the agency’s goals. The central
idea seems to be one of cost-effectiveness: as between two approaches
to promoting those goals, the least burdensome must be chosen.3
Taking the word “minimize” together with the phrase “maximize the
practical utility and public benefit,” we can plausibly understand the
PRA to suggest a kind of cost-benefit test as well: the costs of
paperwork burdens must justify their benefits. And yet there is no
systematic effort, to date, to see which burdens pass that test. Nor is
there an opportunity for judicial review of arbitrary or capricious
collection of information. If an agency is imposing highly burdensome
information collection without good reason, courts appear to be
unavailable, notwithstanding the general rule in favor of review for
arbitrariness.
All this creates serious problems. The idea of “deregulation” is
usually taken to refer to elimination or reduction of the kinds of
burdens imposed through notice-and-comment rulemaking, as with
repeal of rules on the books.4 Elimination or reduction of paperwork

2. 44 U.S.C. § 3504(c) (emphasis added).
3. For discussion of some of the complexities with this concept, see COST-EFFECTIVENESS
IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE (Marthe R. Gold, Louise B. Russell, Joanna E. Siegel & Milton C.
Weinstein eds., 1996).
4. See PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN
ANALYSIS OF ELECTRICAL UTILITY DEREGULATION 211 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation
and the Hard Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 177, 203–04 (noting that “deregulation involves
an inquiry into a well-defined, actual [agency] decision,” with an emphasis on repeal of
regulations).
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is not generally understood as deregulation.5 But in view of its costs,
material and otherwise, paperwork reduction should be considered a
high priority.
Over the last decades, the United States has experienced a costbenefit revolution, in which the benefits of regulations are generally
required to justify their costs.6 To a significant extent, the revolution
has bypassed paperwork burdens. This is a major omission. Whenever
the government imposes such burdens, it should ask the cost-benefit
question. Crucially, it should ask distributional questions as well. Who
is helped by paperwork burdens? Who is hurt? The disabled? The
poor? The elderly? By how much? As we shall see, the most plausible
answers are instructive.
There is an additional point. In recent years, behavioral science
has played a significant role in thinking about regulation, leading not
merely to academic pleas for behaviorally informed initiatives of
various kinds but also to actual initiatives in multiple domains, often
producing large benefits at low cost.7 But if we put a spotlight on
sludge, we will be interested in something different and insufficiently
explored: behaviorally informed deregulation.8 To be sure, fully
rational people, unaffected by behavioral biases, might be, and are,
adversely affected by sludge. As we shall see, however, behavioral
biases of various sorts make sludge especially harmful and sometimes
devastating.
5. For an example of efforts to deregulate in this way, see Memorandum from Cass R.
Sunstein, Admin., OIRA, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies, and Indep. Reg.
Commissions (Aug. 9, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/inforeg/memos/testing-and-simplifying-federal-forms.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9QY-TVUU]
[hereinafter Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein (Aug. 9, 2012)]; Memorandum from Cass R.
Sunstein, Admin., OIRA, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (June 22, 2012),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/oira-reducing-rep-paperwork-burdens-2012.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/FRA5-M5P2] [hereinafter Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein (June 22, 2012)]
(providing direction to agencies consistent with the PRA and Executive Order 13610, Identifying
and Reducing Regulatory Burdens).
6. For a description of this revolution, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT
REVOLUTION (2018) (describing the rise of cost-benefit balancing in government).
7. Examples of such initiatives can be found in DAVID HALPERN, INSIDE THE NUDGE
UNIT (2015); PETE LUNN, REGULATORY POLICY AND BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS (2014);
RHYS JONES, JESSICA PYKETT & MARK WHITEHEAD, CHANGING BEHAVIOURS (201); George
Loewenstein & Nick Chater, Putting Nudges in Perspective, 1 BEHAVIOURAL PUB. POL’Y 26
(2017); Mark Whitehead, Rhys Jones, Rachel Lilley, Rachel Howell & Jessica Pykett,
Neuroliberalism: Cognition, Context, and the Geographical Bounding of Rationality, 42
PROGRESS IN HUM. GEOGRAPHY 325 (2018).
8. In my view, this is a large category that is not limited to sludge, but I am focused only on
the latter issue here.
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Even in a highly polarized time, it should be possible to obtain a
working consensus for many forms of sludge reduction, which can be
sought and enthusiastically approved by people with diverse political
convictions. Whatever one’s convictions, one might support sludge
reduction for small businesses and startups, in the healthcare system,
in transportation, in education, in occupational licensing, and in many
other domains. To be sure, political differences might break out in
some contexts—involving, for example, abortion and divorce—where
differing moral judgments may lead to radically different evaluations
of sludge. But in many contexts, sludge reduction ought to have broad
appeal. And even when disagreements do break out, an improved
understanding of the importance of sludge, and its concrete effects, can
help people to understand where they differ, and exactly why.
The PRA requires the Office of Management and Budget
(“OMB”) to produce an annual report, called the Information
Collection Budget of the United States Government (“ICB”).9 The
ICB quantifies the annual paperwork burden that the U.S. government
imposes on its citizens. The most recent official report finds that in
2015, Americans spent 9.78 billion hours on federal paperwork.10 In
early 2019, an official running count had the number at 11.25 billion
hours;11 that number is almost certainly more accurate than the 2015
figure, but because it has not been subject to the same level of internal
and external scrutiny, I will rely on the 9.78-billion-hour figure here. In
spite of significant shifts,12 the burden has been high for a long time:

9.
10.

44 U.S.C. § 3514(a) (2012).
OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, INFORMATION COLLECTION BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES
GOVERNMENT
2
(2016)
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/
files/omb/inforeg/inforeg/icb/icb_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3FYG-M93W]
[hereinafter
INFORMATION COLLECTION BUDGET 2016]. Puzzlingly, the Trump administration has failed to
produce the annual report, though it is required by law. See Office of Management and Budget
Reports, WHITE HOUSE.GOV, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-regulatoryaffairs/reports [https://perma.cc/B75H-FAL3] (listing the 2016 Information Collection Budget as
the most recent).
11. Government-Wide
Totals
for
Active
Information
Collections,
OIRA,
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAReport?operation=11 [https://perma.cc/H9K2-J424].
12. The significant drop in fiscal year 2010 was principally the result of reassessments of
existing burdens rather than an actual drop in burdens. But there was a significant reduction in
actual burdens from new initiatives, in the vicinity of $386 million. See OFF. OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, INFORMATION COLLECTION BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES Government iv (2011),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/icb/2011_icb.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DNM2-L85D].
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It is worth pausing over those 9.78 billion hours. Suppose that we
assembled every resident of Chicago and insisted that for the entirety
of 2019, each one must work 40 hours a week engaged in just one task:
filling out federal forms. By the end of 2019, the 2.7 million citizens of
Chicago13 will not have come within four billion hours of the annual
paperwork burden placed on Americans.
The 9.78 billion hours take a significant toll.14 The Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) has not attempted to
monetize those hours, though in 2010, it asked for public comments on
13. QuickFacts:
Chicago
City,
Illinois,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/chicagocityillinois [https://perma.cc/R7UR-D89B].
14. Regrettably, the ICB does not make a distinction between voluntary and involuntary
information collections. It is clear, however, that the vast majority are involuntary. For a clue: the
Department of Treasury, mostly through the Internal Revenue Service, accounts for over half of
the total. See INFORMATION COLLECTION BUDGET 2016, supra note 10, at 7 tbl.1 (accounting for
over 6.9 billion of the 9.4 billion paperwork-burden hours in fiscal year 2014).
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whether and how to do so.15 If we value an hour of work at $20,16 9.78
billion hours is the equivalent of $195.6 billion—more than double the
budget of the Department of State17 and the Department of
Transportation,18 about triple the budget of the Department of
Education,19 and about eight times the budget of the Department of
Energy.20 The monetary figures greatly understate the problem.
Administrative burdens can make it difficult or impossible for people
to enjoy fundamental rights (such as the right to vote and the right to
free speech), to obtain licenses and permits, to obtain life-changing
benefits, or to avoid crushing hardship.21 With respect to the right to

15. See Request for Comments on Implementation of the Paperwork Reduction Act, 74
Fed. Reg. 55,269 (Oct. 27, 2009). I served as Administrator of OIRA at the time. OMB and OIRA
asked similar questions in 1999. See Notice of Reevaluation of OMB Guidance on Estimating
Paperwork Burden, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,788 (Oct. 14, 1999). For a valuable relevant discussion, see
generally Adam M. Samaha, Death and Paperwork Reduction, 65 DUKE L.J. 279 (2015).
16. The $20 figure is used to simplify the illustration. The federal government does not have
a standard number, but in Regulatory Impact Analyses it has used numbers from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, which reports an average in the vicinity of $27. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUM. SERV. & FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., TOBACCO PRODUCT STANDARD FOR NNITROSONORNICOTINE LEVEL IN FINISHED SMOKELESS TOBACCO PRODUCTS 78 (Jan. 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/aboutfda/reportsmanualsforms/reports/economicanalyses/ucm5
37872.pdf [https://perma.cc/46HT-25RZ] (“Labor hours are valued at the current market wage as
reported by the May 2015 Occupational Employment Statistics published by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015).”); Average Hourly and Weekly Earnings of All
Employees on Private Nonfarm Payrolls by Industry Sector, Seasonally Adjusted, BUREAU OF
LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t19.htm [https://perma.cc/42WN-8CDG]
(listing the average hourly wage across private industries in January 2019 as $27.56); see also
Samaha, supra note 15, at 298 (“Not knowing who would be randomly selected for the survey, the
[Institute of Museum and Library Services] used the national average per capita income of about
$20 per hour to convert respondent time into dollar cost.”).
17. DEP’T OF STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 1 (2018),
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277155.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9DM2-EYGR]
(requesting a budget of $37.8 billion for the 2019 fiscal year).
18. DEP’T. OF TRANSP., BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS FISCAL YEAR 2019 2 (2018),
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/mission/budget/304476/508dotbh2019b.pdf [https://perma.cc/MDC8-8F93] (requesting a budget of $76.5 billion for the 2019 fiscal year).
19. DEP’T. OF EDUC., FACT SHEET: PRESIDENT TRUMP’S FY 2019 BUDGET 1 (2018),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget19/budget-factsheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
5A8J-X4U9] (requesting a budget of $63.2 billion for the 2019 fiscal year).
20. DEP’T
OF
ENERGY,
FY
2019
BUDGET
FACT
SHEET
1
(2018),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/02/f48/DOE-FY2019-Budget-Fact-Sheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6DZ4-QHGE] (requesting a budget of $30.6 billion for the 2019 fiscal year).
21. Cf. PAMELA HERD & DONALD MOYNIHAN, ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN:
POLICYMAKING BY OTHER MEANS 22–30 (2019) (discussing the concept of administrative burden
and outlining its components); see generally Elizabeth F. Emens, Admin, 103 GEO. L.J. 1409
(2015) (explaining how administrative tasks, like paperwork, hinder the leisure, sleep,
relationships, and work of individuals, especially women); ELIZABETH F. EMENS, LIFE ADMIN:
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choose abortion, such burdens can be decisive impediments.22 They can
also make it difficult for people to receive the Earned Income Tax
Credit, which is one of the nation’s most beneficial antipoverty
programs.23 In short, paperwork burdens have massive negative effects
on people’s lives.
Professor Richard H. Thaler has coined a helpful term for such
burdens: sludge.24 The term should be taken to refer to the kind of
friction, large or small, that people face when they want to go in one or
another direction.25 For their own reasons, whether self-interested or
altruistic, private and public institutions might impose or increase
sludge. In the private sector, companies can use sludge to increase
profits. For example, people might want to cancel a subscription to a
magazine in which they no longer have the slightest interest, but to do
that, they might have to wade through a great deal of sludge.26 In the
public sector, sludge may be an accident, but it might also be a political
choice. People might want to sign their child up for some beneficial
program, such as free transportation or free school meals, but the

HOW I LEARNED TO DO LESS, DO BETTER, AND LIVE MORE (2019) (illustrating the impact of
administrative burdens in life and offering advice to mitigate it).
22. See HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 71–72.
23. Id. at 195–96.
24. Richard H. Thaler, Nudge, Not Sludge, 361 SCIENCE 431 (2018).
25. I am bracketing here the precise relationship between nudge and sludge. It is most useful
to see both terms as descriptive rather than normative. It should be clear that nudges can be for
good or for bad; on the bad, see GEORGE AKERLOF & ROBERT SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS
(2015) (describing, among other examples, the strategies that Cinnabon founder Rich and Greg
Komen developed to push people to making the “unhealthy” decision to eat a Cinnabon). It
should also be clear that sludge can be for good or for bad. It is reasonable to see sludge as a kind
of nudge, in the form of increased friction, which can nudge people in a helpful or unhelpful way.
If people are nudged to choose healthy over unhealthy food, through good choice architecture,
they might face sludge when they seek unhealthy food. To be sure, more work remains to be done
on definitional issues. My hope is that the examples will be sufficient for purposes of the current
discussion.
26. For example, Citizens Advice, a network of independent charities helping consumers
throughout the U.K., performed an analysis of cases and found that, in just three months,
consumers paid an average of £160 toward unwanted subscriptions for gym memberships,
television, insurance, and online streaming services; during that time, nine out of ten consumers
who tried to cancel a subscription were initially refused by the company. Press Release, Citizens
Advice, Citizens Advice Reveals Consumers Spend An Average of £160 on Unwanted
Subscriptions
During
National
Consumer
Week
(Nov.
27,
2017),
https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/about-us/how-citizens-advice-works/media/press-releases/
citizens-advice-reveals-consumers-spend-an-average-of-160-on-unwanted-subscriptions-duringnational-consumer-week [https://perma.cc/U35F-GRTW].
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sludge might defeat them.27 To obtain financial aid for college, students
are required to fill out the Free Application for Federal Student Aid
(“FAFSA”).28 It is long and complicated, and it requires young people
to provide information that they might not have (some of it is on their
parents’ tax returns).29 Many students give up.30 The right to vote may
be the most fundamental of all, but a sludge-filled registration process
may disenfranchise many millions of people.31 A sludge-reduction
initiative be a Voting Rights Act.
A great deal of evidence establishes that reducing administrative
burdens can have a large impact on people’s lives. Millions of people
are now benefiting from the Global Entry Program, which reduces
time, trouble, and stress in security lines at airports.32 For free school

27. A corrective is the direct certification program, discussed below. See DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
DIRECT CERTIFICATION IN THE NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM: STATE
IMPLEMENTATION
PROGRESS,
SCHOOL
YEAR
2014–2015,
at
2
(2015),
https://www.fns.usda.gov/direct-certification-national-school-lunch-program-report-congressstate-implementation-progress-0 [https://perma.cc/D6PP-X4GL].
28. See Eric Bettinger, Bridget Terry Long, Philip Oreopoulos & Lisa Sanbonmatsu, The
Role of Simplification and Information in College Decisions: Results from the H&R Block FAFSA
Experiment 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15361, 2009),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w15361 [https://perma.cc/66EG-VQXD] (“To determine eligibility,
students and their families must fill out an eight-page, detailed application called the Free
Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), which has over 100 questions.”).
29. See Susan Dynarski & Mark Wiederspan, Student Aid Simplification: Looking Back and
Looking Ahead 8–11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17834, 2012),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w17834 [https://perma.cc/5VTH-682V].
30. Id. at 5 (“Millions of students and adult learners who aspire to college are overwhelmed
by the complexity of student aid. Uncertainty and confusion robs them of its significant benefits.”
(quoting ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON STUDENT FIN. ASSISTANCE, THE STUDENT AID
GAUNTLET: MAKING ACCESS TO COLLEGE SIMPLE AND CERTAIN i (2005),
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED496648.pdf [https://perma.cc/788M-DFZ8]).
31. See, e.g., HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 47–60; LA. ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR
THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BARRIERS TO VOTING IN LOUISIANA 25–26 (2018),
https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2018/08-20-LA-Voting-Barriers.pdf [https://perma.cc/VCV4-BVQB]
(recommending reduction in paperwork associated with voter registration to increase access to
the polls); JONATHAN BRATER, KEVIN MORRIS, MYRNA PÉREZ & CHRISTOPHER DELUZIO,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, PURGES: A GROWING THREAT TO THE RIGHT TO VOTE (2018),
http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/purges-growing-threat-right-vote [https://perma.cc/
74YE-P6ZP]; THE LEADERSHIP CONF. EDUC. FUND, THE GREAT POLL CLOSURE (2016),
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/reports/2016/poll-closure-report-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/GRS7953K].
32. See Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Secretary Napolitano
Announces Final Rule for Permanent Global Entry Program (Feb. 6, 2012),
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/secretary-napolitano-announces-finalrule-permanent-global-entry [https://perma.cc/G9WR-PUJB]. The program now has five million
members. Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP Announces 5 Million Global
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meals, the U.S. Department of Agriculture has adopted a “Direct
Certification“ program, which means that parents do not have to take
the trouble to enroll their children at all.33 If the school district has
enough information to know that they are eligible, they are
automatically enrolled.34 In the 2014–15 school year, more than 11
million children benefited from the program (about 91 percent of the
eligible population).35
Simplification of FAFSA dramatically increases the likelihood
that low-income people will apply for aid and eventually enroll in
college.36 A number of states have adopted automatic voter
registration, which means that if eligible citizens interact with a state
agency (say, by receiving a driver’s license), they are registered as
voters.37 In less than a year, Oregon’s automatic registration program
produced more than 250,000 new voters, and almost 100,000 of them
actually voted.38 The private sector can do a great deal more to reduce
sludge—to help workers choose from among healthcare plans, to make
life easier for consumers and employees with ideas or complaints, and
to help people avoid serious risks.39

Entry Members (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbpannounces-5-million-global-entry-members [https://perma.cc/S5VF-HV87].
33. See NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM, supra note 27, at 2 (“Direct certification
typically involves matching SNAP, TANF, and FDPIR records against student enrollment lists,
at either the State or the LEA level.”).
34. Id. at 4.
35. Id. at 15, 24.
36. See Dynarski & Wiederspan, supra note 29, at 19; Bettinger et al., supra note 28, at 23.
37. See Automatic Voter Registration, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/automatic-voter-registration
[https://perma.cc/6EPAGD5T]. As of 2018, thirteen states and the District of Columbia have approved automatic voterregistration policies. These states are: Alaska, California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia.
See History of AVR & Implementation Dates, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/history-avr-implementation-dates [https://perma.cc/
VXY8-RKQB].
38. ROB GRIFFIN, PAUL GRONKE, TOVA WANG & LIZ KENNEDY, CTR. FOR AM. PROG.,
WHO VOTES WITH AUTOMATIC VOTER REGISTRATION? IMPACT ANALYSIS OF OREGON’S
FIRST-IN-THE-NATION PROGRAM (2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/
reports/2017/06/07/433677/votes-automatic-voter-registration/#fn-433677-2
[https://perma.cc/
9L7K-YPWX].
39. For valuable discussion, see generally Emens, Admin, supra note 21. In the healthcare
context, see George Loewenstein et al., A Behavioral Blueprint for Improving Health Care Policy,
3 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & POL’Y 53, 53–66 (2017).
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II. SLUDGE HURTS (AND CAN KILL)
Sludge can make it difficult or impossible for people to enjoy or
exercise constitutional rights. For freedom of speech, licensing schemes
are the most obvious example; they are a form of sludge and are usually
unconstitutional for that reason.40 The ban on prior restraints can be
seen as a ban on sludge.41 In the domain of healthcare, the sludge
imposed on doctors and patients can literally kill.42 In emergency
rooms, for example, sludge has made it unnecessarily difficult for
doctors to prescribe medicines that help patients overcome opioid
addiction.43 Efforts to reduce that sludge, through private initiative and
through law, can save lives.44
To understand why sludge matters, let us begin with the
assumption that people are fully rational and that in deciding whether
to navigate forms, they make some calculation about costs and
benefits. Even if the benefits are high, the relevant costs might prove
overwhelming. These costs can take qualitatively different forms.45
They might involve acquisition of information, which might be difficult
and costly. They might involve time, which people might not have.
They might be psychological, in the sense that they involve frustration,
stigma, and humiliation. For any of those reasons, it might be very
difficult to navigate or overcome the sludge. In some cases, doing the
relevant paperwork might be literally impossible; it simply may not be
feasible for people to fill out the forms. By themselves, these points
help explain low take-up rates for many federal and state programs,46
40. Cf. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575, 576 (1941) (upholding a licensing scheme
that regulated only the “time, place and manner” of speech).
41. Cf. Thomas Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648,
670 (1955) (describing prior restraint as a “particular method of control which experience has
taught tends to create a potent and unnecessary mechanism of government that can smother free
communication”).
42. See Felice J. Freyer, Emergency Rooms Once Offered Little for Drug Users. That’s
Starting
to
Change,
BOS.
GLOBE
(Dec.
10,
2018),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/12/09/emergency-rooms-once-had-little-offeraddicted-people-that-starting-change/guX2LGPqG1UdAf9xUV9rXI/story.html
[https://
perma.cc/FH6P-C2UF].
43. See id.
44. See id. (describing Massachusetts General Hospital’s efforts to increase emergencyroom resources for patients addicted to opioids).
45. See HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 23; Donald Moynihan, Pamela Herd & Hope
Harvey Administrative Burden: Learning, Psychological, and Compliance Costs in Citizen-State
Interactions, 25 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 43, 45–46 (2014) .
46. See Janet Currie, The Take up of Social Benefits 11–12 (Inst. for the Study of Labor in
Bonn, Discussion Paper No. 1103, 2004) (examining rates of enrollment in social benefits within
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as well as the immense difficulty that people often have in obtaining
permits or licenses of various sorts.47 We can even see sludge as an
obstacle to freedom, especially insofar as it reduces or impairs
navigability.48
A. “Everyone Believes In Redemption”
An assortment of human biases, emphasized by behavioral
economists, amplify the real-world effects of administrative burdens.
For many people, inertia is a powerful force,49 and people tend to
procrastinate.50 If people suffer from inertia and if they procrastinate,
they might never do the necessary paperwork. The problem is
compounded by “present bias.”51 The future often seems like a foreign
country—Laterland—and people are not sure that they will ever visit.
It is often tempting to put off administrative tasks until another day.
That day may never come, even if the consequences of delay are quite
serious.

the United States and United Kingdom); see generally Katherine Baicker, William J. Congdon, &
Sendhil Mullainathan, Health Insurance Coverage and Take-Up: Lessons from Behavioral
Economics, 90 MILBANK Q. 107 (2012) (examining low health-insurance take-up rates from a
behavioral-economic perspective); Carole Roan Gresenz, Sarah E. Edgington, Miriam Laugesen,
& José J. Escarce, Take-Up of Public Insurance and Crowd-Out of Private Insurance Under Recent
CHIP Expansions to Higher Income Children, 47 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1999 (2012) (analyzing
the effect of expanding CHIP eligibility on health-insurance take-up rates); Saurabh Bhargava &
Dayanand Manoli, Improving Take-Up of Tax Benefits in the United States, ABDUL LATIF
JAMEEL POVERTY ACTION LAB (2015), https://www.povertyactionlab.org/evaluation/improvingtake-tax-benefits-united-states [https://perma.cc/TPW8-XDHU] (noting that “many people who
are eligible for social and economic benefits do not claim those benefits” in the United States).
47. REGULATORY REFORM TEAM, Case Study: Chicago Licensing and Permitting Reform,
DATA-SMART CITY SOLUTIONS (Mar. 19, 2015), https://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/
article/case-study-chicago-licensing-and-permitting-reform-647 [https://perma.cc/X3YJ-JSLM]
(assessing the regulatory landscape of the city of Chicago, and finding, among other things, that
“[a]pproximately 17% of zoning licenses were not being processed and sent back due to
insufficient information”).
48. On this theme, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ON FREEDOM (2019).
49. Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k)
Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON 1149, 1185 (2001) (identifying inertia as a force
working against participation in 401(k) plans); see also John Pottow & Omri Ben-Shahar, On the
Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 651, 651 (2006) (“It is by now recognized that
factors beyond drafting costs might also cause parties to stick with an undesirable default rule . . .
.”).
50. George Akerlof, Procrastination and Obedience, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 1–17 (1991)
(examining several “behavioral patholog[ies],” including procrastination).
51. See Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Present Bias: Lessons Learned and to be
Learned, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 273, 273–78 (2015).
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Mail-in forms impose a type of sludge.52 They provide people with
an opportunity to obtain a nontrivial gain, often in the form of a check,
but they require people to overcome inertia. As an illustration of the
relationship between behavioral biases and sludge, consider a study of
people’s failure to redeem such forms, with a memorably precise name:
Everyone Believes In Redemption.53 Across various markets,
redemption rates usually range between 10 percent and 40 percent,
which means that a strong majority of customers forget or simply do
not bother.54 Because of the power of inertia, that might not be terribly
surprising. What is more striking is the finding that people are
unrealistically optimistic about the likelihood that they will ever
redeem forms.55 In the relevant study, people thought that there was
about an 80 percent chance that they would do so within the 30 days
they were given.56 The actual redemption rate was 31 percent.57 It is an
overstatement to say that everyone believes in redemption—but most
people certainly do.
In the same study, the researchers made three efforts (with
different groups of people) to reduce the massive difference between
the predicted and actual redemption rates. First, they informed
participants, very clearly, that in previous groups with similar people,
redemption rates were below one-third.58 Second, they issued two clear
reminders, one soon after purchase and another when the deadline for
redemption was near.59 Third, they made redemption far simpler by
eliminating the requirement that people must print out and sign a
certification page.60
As it turned out, not one of the three interventions reduced
people’s optimism. In all conditions, people thought there was about
an 80 percent chance that they would mail in the forms.61 Moreover,
and somewhat surprisingly, the first two interventions had no effect on

52. See Matthew Edwards, The Law, Marketing and Behavioral Economics of Consumer
Rebates, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 362, 419–21 (2007).
53. Joshua Tasoff & Robert Letzler, Everyone Believes in Redemption: Nudges and
Overoptimism in Costly Task Completion, 107 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 107, 115 (2014).
54. Id. at 108.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 113.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 114.
61. Id. at 115.
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what people actually did. When hearing about the behavior of other
groups, people apparently thought, “Well, those are other groups.
What do they have to do with us?” In other contexts, reminders often
work because they focus people’s attention and reduce the power of
inertia. But in this case, reminders turned out to be useless.62
The only effective intervention was simplification, which had a
strong impact on what people actually did.63 By making it easier to mail
in the form and thus reducing sludge, simplification significantly
increased people’s willingness to act. The redemption rate rose to
about 54 percent, which means that the disparity between belief and
behavior was cut in half.64
B. Behavioral Biases and Sludge
The relevant study is of course relatively narrow, but it has large
implications. Recall that inertia is a powerful force and that, because
of inertia, people might not fill out necessary forms.65 That is one
reason that participation rates are often much lower with opt-in designs
than with opt-out designs.66 Recall too that inertia is aggravated by
present bias, leading people to focus on the short term and neglect the
future.67
Suppose in this light that under federal regulations, individuals,
small businesses, and startups must fill out certain forms in order to be
eligible for important benefits or to avoid significant penalties. They
might intend to do exactly that, but if the task can be put off, or if it is
burdensome or difficult, their behavior might not match their
intentions. The actual costs might turn out to be very high; the
perceived costs might be far higher. To get slightly ahead of the story:

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Madrian & Shea, supra note 49, at 1185; see generally William Samuelson & Richard
Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988) (finding
that status quo bias influences students’ decisions about healthcare plans and retirement
programs).
66. For an especially dramatic illustration, see Peter Bergman, Jessica Lasky-Fink & Todd
Rogers, Simplification and Defaults Affect Adoption and Impact of Technology, But Decision
Makers Do Not Realize This (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research Working Paper Series,
Working Paper No. RWP17-021, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233874 [https://perma.cc/
YWN6-BBCJ].
67. See Keith Marzilli Ericson & David Laibson, Intertemporal Choice 27–32 (Nat. Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25358, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25358
[https://perma.cc/E9TG-5FAS] (reviewing models and empirical research on present bias).
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it would make sense for federal regulators to “scrub” existing
paperwork burdens to make sure that they are not doing unintended
or inadvertent harm. That is the idea of a “Sludge Audit.”
The right to vote may be the most fundamental of all, and federal
law requires states to send mail-in forms (“return cards”) before
purging voters from electoral rolls on change-of-residence grounds (if
a voter has not already confirmed a move).68 Each state is allowed to
choose its own trigger for sending the return card. Some states use
change-of-address information provided by the United States Postal
Service,69 but others use methods that can very foreseeably flag voters
who have in fact not moved and thus remain eligible.70 A qualified
voter can be struck for failing to mail the return card back and not
voting for four years.71 Voters—along with Congress72 and the Supreme
Court73—may be optimistic that they will do that, but their optimism
might be misplaced.
More generally, sludge has a significant impact that many people
do not foresee. As the redemption study shows, people are
unrealistically optimistic about the likelihood that they will overcome
inertia. Even specialists might be surprised at the extent to which
apparently promising strategies fail. In addition, sludge can be used

68. National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 52 U.S.C. § 20507(d) (2012). This provision of
the National Voter Registration Act, among other purposes, is aimed to “ensure that accurate
and current voter registration rolls are maintained.” 52 U.S.C. § 20501(b)(4).
69. This is the practice suggested by federal law. See 52 U.S.C. § 20507(c)(1). Thirty-six
states do at least this. See NAT’L ASSN. OF SECRETARIES OF STATE, NASS REPORT:
MAINTENANCE OF STATE VOTER REGISTRATION LISTS 5–6 (2017) (Dec. 2017),
https://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/reports/nass-report-voter-reg-maintenance-finaldec17.pdf [https://perma.cc/FXJ6-RPXK].
70. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 48A.28.3 (2018) (permitting the sending of notice each year);
GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-234(a)(1)–(2) (2018) (notice sent to registrants with whom there has been
“no contact” for three years); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 25, § 1901(b)(3) (2018) (notice sent to voters
who have not voted in five years); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.21(B)(2) (2018) (notice sent to
those who fail to vote in two consecutive federal elections). Note also that some states trigger
notices based on dubious interstate databases. See, e.g., OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 230:15–11–
19(a)(3) (2018) (notice sent to those who have not voted since the “second previous General
Election” and those who fail references to interstate databases); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 6.50(1) (2018)
(notice sent to voters who have not voted in four years); see also JONATHAN BRATER, ET AL.,
supra note 31, at 7–8 (explaining how the system used by Oklahoma, “Crosscheck,” is unreliable
and inaccurate).
71. See 52 U.S.C. § 20507(d)(1)(ii).
72. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(d) makes failure to send the return card back one of the two sufficient
conditions for removing a registered voter from the rolls on change-of-address grounds.
73. Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1845 (2018) (rejecting the argument
that voters throw away return cards so often as to make them “worthless”).
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opportunistically by clever marketers who seek to give consumers the
impression that they will receive an excellent deal but who know that
consumers will not take advantage of the opportunity.74 In many cases,
government officials are not seeking to act opportunistically; they are
responding to political values and commitments, which is not the same
thing.75 At the same time, sludge might have a damaging effect that
they do not anticipate. In particular, officials might not understand the
extent to which sludge will adversely affect a population that they are
seeking to help.
C. Cognition and Scarcity
With respect to redemption, the power of simplification puts a
spotlight on the large consequences of seemingly modest
administrative burdens—on the effects of “choice architecture” in
determining outcomes.76 I have noted that in many domains,
participation rates can be dramatically increased with a mere shift from
requiring people to apply (opt-in) to automatically enrolling them (optout).77 In an especially dramatic study, Professors Peter Bergman of
Columbia University and Todd Rogers of Harvard University found
that if parents are asked whether they want to sign up to receive textmessage alerts about the academic progress of their children,
participation rates are tiny—around 1 percent.78 If the signup process
is simplified, participation rates increase significantly, to about 8
percent.79 But if parents are automatically signed up, participation rates
jump to 96 percent.80 To be sure, most changes in choice architecture

74. For relevant discussion, see Petra Persson, Attention Manipulation and Information
Overload, 2 BEHAVIOURAL PUB. POL’Y 78 (2018); Thomas Blake, Sarah Moshary, Kane
Sweeney & Steven Tadelis, Price Salience and Product Choice (NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON.
RESEARCH, Working Paper No. 25186, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25186?sy=186
[https://perma.cc/Y54U-9K9S].
75. See Moynihan et al., supra note 45, at 65 (outlining how burdens may be imposed to
serve legitimate political values).
76. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 83–105 (2008)
(describing choice architecture).
77. See Eric Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 SCIENCE 1338,
1338–39 (2003) (explaining that organ donation increases when it is opt-out rather than opt-in).
78. Peter Bergman & Todd Rogers, The Impact of Defaults on Technology Adoption 5
(Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. RWP17021,
2018),
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/todd_rogers/files/bergman_and_rogers_the
_impact_of_defaults.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7GF-BCY9].
79. Id.
80. Id.
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do not have effects of that magnitude.81 But simplification and burden
reduction do not merely reduce frustration; they can change people’s
lives.
An underlying reason is that our cognitive resources are limited.82
Inevitably, we are able to focus on only a small subset of life’s
challenges. For those who are busy, poor, disabled, or elderly, the
problem of cognitive scarcity is especially serious.83 For that reason, it
is important to focus on the distributional effects of administrative
burdens—on whom they are most likely to hurt.84
As a practical matter, the answer is often the poorest among us. A
central reason is that if you are poor, you have to focus on a wide range
of immediately pressing problems.85 If the government is asking poor
people to navigate a complex system or to fill out a lot of forms, they
might give up. But the problem is hardly limited to the poor. When
programs are designed to benefit the elderly, sludge might be especially
damaging, at least if the population suffers from reduced cognitive
capacity. For different reasons, the problem of sex equality deserves
particular attention.86 Because women do a disproportionate amount
of administrative work—running the household, arranging meals,
taking care of children—a significant reduction in sludge could address
a pervasive source of social inequality, with ramifying effects on other
areas of life.

81. See, e.g., Madrian & Shea, supra note 49, at 1184 (summarizing behavioral changes
resulting from 401(k) participation and savings behavior as a result of changing default options).
For a discussion of the effect of inertia on choice of travel modes, see Alessandro Innocenti,
Patrizia Lattarulo & Maria Grazia Pazienza, Heuristics and Biases in Travel Mode Choice 20
(LabSi, Working Paper No. 27/2009, 2009), http://www.labsi.org/wp/labsi27.pdf [https://
perma.cc/P23F-42UL].
82. See Xavier Gabaix, Behavioral Inattention (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 24096, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24096 [https://perma.cc/FQ2L-M3VN].
83. See SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR, SCARCITY: WHY HAVING TOO
LITTLE MEANS SO MUCH 147–66 (2013).
84. See HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21. For helpful related discussion, see Jessica
Roberts, Nudge-Proof: Distributive Justice and the Ethics of Nudging, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1045
(2018). The idea has support in the PRA, which requires “particular emphasis on those individuals
and entities most adversely affected.” 44 U.S.C. § 3504(c)(3) (2012).
85. For a series of demonstrations, see HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 30–31.
86. See text accompanying supra note 21 (explaining that a disproportionate amount of
everyday administrative burdens fall on women).
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III. A VERY QUICK TOUR OF THE HORIZON
It would be valuable to catalogue an assortment of programs that
have been adversely affected, to varying degrees, by sludge.87 A book
could easily be written on that topic. Instead of venturing that, I will
borrow heavily from a superb treatment by Professors Pamela Herd
and Donald Moynihan, who offer a series of case studies. Herd and
Moynihan demonstrate that in some programs, burdens are a serious
problem, but in others, the government has ensured that they are
negligible. With respect to sludge, a model program is Social Security,
which is simple and in many ways automatic. As Herd and Moynihan
put it, “the biggest bookkeeping organization in the world banished
burdens.”88 The U.S. government bears the relevant administrative
burdens, and it generally requires citizens to do very little. The Social
Security Administration (“SSA”) tracks people’s earnings and
determines eligibility and benefit levels automatically. If you are
eligible, you can enroll online or go to one of the nation’s 1200 field
offices.89 After you do that, you are likely to receive direct deposits into
your bank account within a month.90
As a matter of history, there is a large irony here. In the 1930s, the
supposed administrative challenge was taken as a serious objection to
the very idea of Social Security.91 But the federal government
succeeded it meeting that challenge. It did so in part through the
creation and use of Social Security numbers, which make it much
simpler to track people’s earnings over their entire working lives.92 The
SSA has worked hard and mostly successfully to cut sludge and thus to
make things easy for beneficiaries, replacing lost Social Security cards,
taking applications, updating records, and ensuring the accuracy of
payments.93 For beneficiaries, the program is working. The poverty
rate among older adults is now just 9 percent; if Social Security were
not included in their income, it would be 40 percent.94 Almost one-third
87. For a valuable discussion of sludge in the context of medical education, see generally
Joel Yager & Jeffrey E. Katzman, Bureaucrapathologies: Galloping Regulosis, Assessment
Degradosis, and Other Unintended Organizational Maladies in Post-Graduate Medical Education,
39 ACAD. PSYCHIATRY 678 (2015).
88. Id. at 215.
89. Id. at 233.
90. Id. at 215.
91. Id. at 219; 225–26.
92. Id. at 227.
93. Id. at 233.
94. Id. at 237.
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of beneficiaries rely on the program for at least 90 percent of their
income.95
The level of sludge is also relatively low for the Earned Income
Tax Credit (“EITC”), a wage subsidy for low-income workers.96 Most
programs designed to benefit poor people have dispiriting take-up
rates of between 30 and 60 percent; for the EITC, the rate is about 80
percent.97 That is excellent news, for the EITC ranks among the most
effective of U.S. antipoverty programs. Because it makes work more
remunerative, it significantly increases labor-force participation.98 The
EITC also makes a major dent in the national poverty rate and helps
children in particular, with beneficial effects on their health, their
cognitive abilities, and their long-term educational prospects.99
For the EITC, the relatively high take-up rate is a product of
relatively low levels of sludge. The paperwork requirements are
modest; a standard tax return is all that is necessary. The Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) sends simple, clear reminders to people who
appear to be eligible, and the reminders significantly increase
participation rates.100 It also runs voluntary programs that provide free
tax help. Because participation involves little in the way of frustration
or stigma, the psychological costs are low. True, the EITC is not as
simple or automatic as Social Security, and sludge reduction thus
remains a priority. If 20 percent of eligible people are not receiving the
benefit, there is a serious problem. The IRS almost certainly knows
enough to enroll people automatically and send a refund to eligible
taxpayers.101 Nonetheless, the administrative burdens for recipients are
much lower than they might be, partly because of an unlikely coalition
between business interests and those seeking to help the working
poor.102

95. Id.
96. For a general discussion, see MAKING WORK PAY (Bruce Meyer & Douglas HoltzEakin eds. 2002).
97. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 191.
98. Id. at 196.
99. Id. at 194.
100. Id. at 196.
101. Surprisingly, there appears to be no literature on automatic enrollment and the EITC.
This area deserves sustained study.
102. Id. at 213.
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Herd and Moynihan contrast benefits programs that impose far
more daunting burdens. For the Affordable Care Act,103 federalism has
turned out to be a major challenge. Opposed to the very idea of
Obamacare, twenty-seven states simply refused to adopt exchanges,
which were supposed to provide people with a simple, relatively
sludge-free way to buy health insurance.104 Citizens in those states have
had to apply through federal exchanges, and that is far more
cumbersome. Successful applicants initially receive a notice from the
federal government that they are eligible for the state Medicaid
program. The federal government then transfers the file to the state.
After that, the state determines eligibility.105 This process can take
months, and it has left millions of people in limbo. The Obama
administration reduced burdens by publicizing the program and by
simplifying coordination. But the Trump administration reduced
funding for publicity and shortened the signup period.106
Medicare is a nearly universal program aimed at older people.107
Those who are eligible for Social Security are usually eligible for
Medicare too. The sludge comes from the astonishingly complex
process faced by Medicare enrollees when choosing among services.
What is the right supplemental insurance plan? What is the right
prescription drug plan? Is a Medicare Advantage Plan a good idea?
These are difficult questions, and as Herd and Moynihan emphasize,
older adults often suffer from cognitive decline.108 They quote a
Medicare beneficiary who notes, “That’s what gets me, they wait until
we retire to make it complicated.”109 A great deal of behavioral
evidence finds that Medicare beneficiaries are making poor choices
and losing money in the process.110 For that reason, there is a good
103. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012)).
104. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 98.
105. Id. at 99.
106. Id. at 118.
107. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as amended
in scattered sections at 25, 26, 29 & 42 U.S.C. (2012)). Medicare is understood in four parts.
Hospital insurance in Part A, 42 U.S.C. § 1395c; supplemental medical insurance in Part B, 42
U.S.C. § 1395j; managed care in Part C, 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21; and drug benefits in Part D, 42
U.S.C. § 1395w-101.
108. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 134–35.
109. Id. at 134.
110. See Saurabh Bhargava, George Loewenstein & Justin Sydnor, Choose to Lose: Health
Plan Choices From a Menu With Dominated Options, 132 Q. J. ECON. 1319, 1322 (2017) (noting
that in both experimental and field studies, individuals did not select the most financially efficient
Medicare plans).
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argument that the government should simplify the process with the use
of online tools, telephone assistance (with shorter waiting times), and
customized recommendations.111
Under current law, states are allowed to regulate the abortion
right so long as their regulations do not impose an “undue burden.”112
Because that standard has a degree of elasticity, it invites states to take
steps to discourage abortion. They have enthusiastically taken up the
invitation.113 For example, states have required pregnant women to
engage in mandatory counselling, which includes descriptions not only
of the procedure but also of fetal pain. They have required women to
take and see an ultrasound, to make multiple visits to clinics, and to
undergo significant waiting periods.114 These requirements impose
evident costs in terms of learning, compliance, and psychology.
To capture those costs, Herd and Moynihan offer an extensive
quotation from a thirty-five-year-old woman, describing her
experience of navigating administrative burdens in Wisconsin. Here is
an excerpt:
I am shaken. I am embarrassed. I am tired of waiting. I am now called
into a room. I can bring Hubby this time. We are told to watch a video,
again required by state law. The video talks about adoption, foster
parenthood, the dangers of abortion, my rights. It drags on. I feel like
a small child. Husband looks concerned and helpless. I sign a form
indicating my understanding of the information presented on the
video. We wait. A nurse finally comes back in. Time to go back to the
waiting room. We’ll call you in a short while.115

These administrative burdens have had an impact. According to
one study, they increase the cost of abortion by 19 percent and decrease
the number of abortions by between 13 and 15 percent.116 One
consequence appears to be an increase in the incidence of selfadministered abortions.117

111. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 138.
112. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
113. See HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 90–92; Kate L. Fetrow, Note, Taking
Abortion Rights Seriously: Toward a Holistic Undue Burden Jurisprudence, 70 STAN. L. REV. 319,
322 (2018) (noting that the “undue burden” standard allows states to chip away at the right to an
abortion).
114. Id. at 71.
115. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 78–79.
116. Id. at 82.
117. Id.
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The Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, forbidding
denial of the vote “on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude,” was ratified in 1870,118 but administrative burdens have long
been used to disenfranchise African Americans. For decades, literacy
tests were a favorite instrument; they were eventually forbidden by the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.119 In recent years, administrative burdens
have become less onerous, in the sense that voting is more convenient,
and registration is generally easier.120 But such burdens continue to
exist, and in some states, they are mounting. They are plainly being
used as a political weapon, most prominently by Republican leaders
seeking to impose sludge so as to increase their electoral prospects.121
Some states are purging from the voter rolls people who have not
voted for a specified number of years or responded to a notice, thus
requiring them to register again.122 Other states are purging voters on
the basis of flawed technologies designed to prevent noncitizens or
felons from voting.123 Some states require state-issued photo
identification.124 That might not seem so onerous, but according to
some estimates, about 11 percent of Americans do not have a stateissued photo identification (including about 25 percent of African
Americans).125 States have also increased residency requirements and
required proof of citizenship.126 With respect to the right to vote,
administrative burdens of multiple kinds are working to disenfranchise
African Americans, the elderly, and low-income individuals.127

118. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
119. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10101,
10301–10314, 10501–10508, 10701–10702 (2012)). Literacy tests are prohibited under 52
U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(C).
120. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 47.
121. Id. at 63–64 (noting the correlation between Republican states and voter ID laws and
explaining the correlation with party policies).
122. See text accompanying supra, note 71; see also HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at
53
123. See BRATER ET AL., supra note 31, at 5–10.
124. See Voter Identification Requirements: Voter ID Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx [https://
perma.cc/QF6Z-VAKK] (noting that 34 states have laws requesting or requiring voters to show
some form of identification to vote, and seven of those require state-issued photo identification).
125. Denise Lieberman, Barriers to the Ballot Box: New Restrictions Underscore the Need for
Voting Laws Enforcement, 39 HUM. RTS. 2, 3 (2012).
126. See HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 52.
127. Id. at 2.
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IV. JUSTIFYING SLUDGE
Notwithstanding these points, paperwork burdens often serve
important goals. Sometimes they are indispensable. As the examples
suggest, we can readily imagine five possible justifications for sludge:
(1) program integrity, (2) self-control problems, (3) privacy, (4)
targeting, and (5) data collection.
A. Program Integrity
When agencies impose paperwork burdens, it is often because of
a desire to ensure that programs work in the way that the law requires.
One reason involves eligibility restrictions; another involves recordkeeping. What is true for the private sector is true for the public sector
as well. Those who seek a loan, private or public, face sludge. The
central reason is to ensure that they actually qualify. People should not
receive Medicare, Medicaid, the EITC, or Social Security unless they
are entitled to the relevant benefits, and sludge is often a way of
collecting necessary information. Even in the context of voting rights,
burdens of various sorts can be and often are justified as a means of
ensuring that would-be voters meet existing legal requirements. For
spending programs, a usual justification for paperwork burdens points
to “fraud, waste, and abuse”;128 sludge can be an effort to reduce all
three.
It is true that with the increasing availability of information and
with machine learning, private and public institutions might be able to
find the relevant information on their own. In the private sector, some
companies use the idea of “prequalification,” which means that they
have enough information to know, in advance, that some people are
already qualified for goods or services.129 Sometimes forms can be

128. See 6 U.S.C. § 795 (2012) (“The Administrator shall ensure that all programs within the
Agency administering Federal disaster relief assistance develop and maintain proper internal
management controls to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse.”); Jerry L. Mashaw &
Theodore R. Marmor, Conceptualizing, Estimating, and Reforming Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in
Healthcare Spending, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 455 (1994); Julie K. Taitsman, Educating Physicians to
Prevent Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 102, 102 (2011); 6 U.S.C. § 795 (“The
Administrator shall ensure that all programs within the Agency administering Federal disaster
relief assistance develop and maintain proper internal management controls to prevent and detect
fraud, waste, and abuse.”).
129. For a prescient discussion, see generally Ekambaram Paleenswaran & Mohan
Kumaraswamy, Recent Advances and Proposed Improvements in Contractor Prequalification
Methodologies, 36 BUILDING & ENV’T 73 (2001).
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“prepopulated”; as a result, forms might not be necessary.130 In the
domain of taxation, one example is the idea of return-free filing, which
eliminates the need for taxpayers to fill out forms at all.131 In the
fullness of time, we should see significant movements in this
direction.132
But those movements remain incipient. For the present and the
near future, the most obvious justifications for sludge go by the name
of “program integrity.”133 Suppose that the IRS decided to send the
EITC to apparently eligible taxpayers. If it could do so at low cost, and
if the apparently eligible taxpayers are in fact eligible, there would be
little ground for objection. The problem, of course, is the word
“apparently.” It is possible that some of the recipients will not in fact
be eligible. Whenever people are automatically enrolled in a program,
some of them may not meet the legal criteria.
When this is so, regulators must choose between (1) a design
ensuring that some eligible people will not receive a benefit and (2) a
design ensuring that some ineligible people will receive a benefit. If the
idea of program integrity is meant to refer to the number of errors, the

130. Note the emphasis on prepopulation in Memorandum from Neomi Rao, Admin., OIRA,
to Chief Information Officers 8 (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/Minimizing-Paperwork-and-Reporting-Burdens-Data-Call-for-the2018-ICB.pdf [https://perma.cc/KF9L-N6NZ] [hereinafter Memorandum from Neomi Rao (Aug.
6, 2018)] (“Sometimes agencies collect data that are unchanged from prior applications; in such
circumstances, they may be able to use, or to give people the option to use, pre-populated
electronic forms.”).
131. See AUSTAN GOOLSBEE, BROOKINGS INST., THE ‘SIMPLE RETURN’: REDUCING
AMERICA’S
TAX
BURDEN
THROUGH
RETURN-FREE
FILING
2 (2006), https://
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/200607goolsbee.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C6955YQL] (“For the millions of taxpayers who could use the Simple Return, however, filing a tax
return would entail nothing more than checking the numbers, signing the return, and then either
sending a check or getting a refund.”).
132. See Memorandum from Neomi Rao (Aug. 6, 2018) supra note 130, at 8 (“Also worth
considering is whether, in some circumstances, to dispense with forms entirely and to rely on more
automatic, generic, or direct approval of participation.”)
133. See Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat.
2242 (2015) (referring to Title II as “Program Integrity” and specifically intending to reduce
fraudulent and improper payments in the EITC and other programs); Leslie Book, David
Williams & Krista Holub, Insights from Behavioral Economics Can Improve Administration of
the EITC, 37 VA. TAX REV. 177, 180 (2018) (noting that “[p]rogram integrity” of the EITC was
an important topic among employees of the IRS because 43 to 50 percent of all EITC returns are
incorrect, with most errors benefitting claimants); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
Program
Integrity,
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/program-integrity/index.html
[https://perma.cc/2ZMC-XTSH] (Medicaid Program Integrity); Reducing Improper Payments,
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/improperpayments [https://perma.cc/T8ZN-XA32]
(Social Security programs).
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choice between (1) and (2) might turn purely on arithmetic. Which
group is larger? If automatic enrollment means that 500,000 eligible
people receive the benefit who otherwise would not, and if a degree of
sludge means that 499,999 ineligible people receive the benefit who
otherwise would not, automatic enrollment is justified.
But it would be possible to see things differently. Suppose that
automatic enrollment gives benefits to 200,000 eligible people but also
to 200,001 ineligible people. Some people might think that if the
200,001 people are nearly eligible—if they are relatively poor—it is not
so terrible if they receive some economic help. But other people might
insist that taxpayer money is accompanied by clear restrictions and
argue that if it is given out in violation of those restrictions, a grave
wrong has been committed. On this view, even a modest breach of
program integrity, for the advantage of those who are not eligible, is
unacceptable.
The most extreme version of this view would be that a grant of
benefits to a very large number of eligibles would not outweigh the
grant of benefits to a very small number of ineligibles. From a welfarist
standpoint, the most extreme version is hard or perhaps impossible to
defend: a grant of benefits to a hundred people who are almost (but
not) eligible would seem to be a price worth paying in exchange for a
grant of benefits to a million people who are in fact eligible. But the
correct tradeoff is not self-evident, and reasonable people might differ.
We can generalize this example. In the direct-certification
program for school lunches, the level of accuracy appears to be very
high; few ineligible children are allowed to qualify.134 When sludge is
eliminated through automaticity, objections are weakened when
benefits are not conferred on the ineligible. To the extent that they are,
tradeoffs are inevitable, and different people can make different
judgments. Consider the question of voter registration. Sludge has
been defended as a way of combatting the risk of fraud and thus
ensuring the integrity of the voting process.135 On imaginable

134. See NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM, supra note 27, at xiii (noting that states are
required by federal law to “establish a system of direct certification of school-age SNAP
participants”). To identify eligible students, most states compare SNAP files to enrolled student
files and match them with varying criteria. Massachusetts uses first and last name along with date
of birth as primary matching criteria, but the other states surveyed use multiple criteria that make
an improper match unlikely. Id. at 28–33.
135. See, e.g., Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1848 (“The NVRA plainly
reflects Congress’s judgment that the failure to send back the card, coupled with the failure to
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assumptions, sludge reduction could ensure that eligible people are
allowed to vote while also ensuring that the same is true of (some)
ineligible voters. The size of the two categories surely matters.
B. Self-Control Problems
Administrative burdens of diverse kinds might be designed to
promote better decisions—to counteract self-control problems,
recklessness, and impulsivity. Sludge can be a way of protecting people
against their own errors. For that reason, sludge can easily be judged
as a cure for a behavioral problem. Behavioral scientists sometimes
contrast System 1 with System 2, where System 1 is rapid, intuitive, and
often emotional, and System 2 is deliberative and reflective.136 Sludge
is a way to strengthen the hand of System 2.
For mundane decisions, small administrative burdens are
frequently imposed online, with questions asking whether you are
“sure you want to” send an email without a subject line, activate a
ticket, cancel a recent order, or delete a file. Those burdens can be an
excellent idea.
A degree of sludge, imposed by private and public institutions,
might make sense for life-altering decisions, such as marriage and
divorce.137 “Cooling-off periods” can be a blessing.138 If System 1 is
leading people to make rash decisions, a mandatory waiting time might
be useful as a way of allowing System 2 to have its say.139 Some sludge

vote during the period covering the next two general federal elections, is significant evidence that
the addressee has moved.”).
136. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 13–15 (2011).
137. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.04 (2018) (making the effective date of marriage licenses
three days after application unless both partners take a premarital education course); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 208, § 21 (2018) (allowing divorce to become absolute 90 days after the initial
judgment).
138. See Pamaria Rekaiti & Roger Van den Bergh, Cooling-Off Periods in the Consumer
Laws of the EC Member States: A Comparative Law and Economics Approach, 23 J. CONSUMER
POL’Y 371, 397 (2000) (“Cooling-off periods are potential remedies for the problems of irrational
behaviour, situational monopoly, and informational asymmetry.”); Dainn Wie & Hyoungjong
Kim, Between Calm and Passion: The Cooling-Off Period and Divorce Decisions in Korea, 21
FEMINIST ECON. 187, 209 (2015) (“The cooling-off period has no significant impact on divorce
rates when the cause of divorce is . . . dishonesty, abuse, or discord with other family members. . .
. [C]ouples reporting the cause of divorce as personality difference or financial distress responded
to the cooling-off periods.”).
139. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1187–88 (2003); see generally Wie & Kim, supra note 138 (finding that
the mandatory cooling-off period for divorce reduced the final divorce rate in Korea).
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might also make sense before the purchase of guns, partly as a way of
promoting deliberation.140
The abortion right is highly controversial, of course, but for that
very reason, it is an especially interesting example. For example, some
people think that counseling requirements and mandatory 24-hour
waiting periods are legitimate ways of protecting women from making
decisions that they will regret, or of protecting fetal life. Other people
think that the burdens are simply an effort to discourage the exercise
of a constitutional right.141 But even if we bracket the deepest issues, it
is hardly impossible, in light of the stakes of the decision, to defend
some administrative burdens as efforts to promote reflection and to
provide valuable information.
C. Privacy and Security
Administrative burdens are often imposed in order to obtain
information about people’s backgrounds—their employment history,
their income, their criminal history (if any), their credit rating, their
family history, their places of residence. Those who seek to work in
government, certainly at levels that involve national security, are
required to provide a great deal of information of that sort.142 It is at
least reasonable to think that if private and public institutions are to
receive some or all of that information, it must be with people’s explicit
consent. If so, the question is whether to ask people to face
administrative burdens or instead to intrude on their privacy. Perhaps
it is not so terrible if the government chooses the former.
At one period, of course, officials had no real option. They could
not intrude on privacy, because they lacked the means to do so.
Increasingly, however, private and public institutions actually have
independent access to that information, or they might be able to obtain
it with a little effort. As a result, they are in a position to reduce sludge.
Return, as a simple example, to the Direct Certification program of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture.143 Officials know who is poor, and so
140. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 26815(a) (2018) (requiring a waiting period of ten days
for all firearm purchases).
141. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 918–21 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing these potential justifications but concluding
that the 24-hour waiting period is unconstitutional).
142. For an example, see U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., STANDARD FORM 86:
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY POSITIONS (2010), https://www.opm.gov/forms/
pdf_fill/sf86-non508.pdf [https://perma.cc/KB9P-JJ8D].
143. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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they can directly certify them. In countless other cases, available data
can enable private or public institutions to announce, very simply, that
certain people are eligible, and on what terms. They might be able to
prepopulate forms. They might be able to share data.144 To that extent,
sludge can be a thing of the past.
But would that be desirable? Not necessarily. Automatic
enrollment might well depend on a great deal of information gathering
by institutions that people distrust. In some cases, there is a trade-off
between irritating burdens on the one hand and potential invasions of
privacy on the other. Consider, for example, the question of how much
information credit-card companies should acquire before offering
cards to customers. We might welcome situations in which such
companies can learn what is required and simply send people offers or
even cards. Whether we should do so depends in part of what
information they have and whether it might be misused. If government
has or acquires the relevant information, the risks might be thought
unacceptable.
The question of security is closely related. To set up an online
account, people might be asked to provide, and might be willing to
provide, sensitive information—involving, for example, their bank
account or their credit card. Sludge might be designed to ensure against
security violations. People might have to answer questions about their
address, their Social Security number, or their mother’s maiden name.
These questions are not exactly fun, but they might be justified as a
means of ensuring against some kind of breach. Ideally, of course, we
would have some clarity about the benefits and costs of obtaining the
relevant information. But if costs and benefits are difficult to specify, it
might make sense to have a rough-and-ready sense that a degree of
not-especially-onerous sludge is desirable to prevent the worst-case
scenarios.145
D. Targeting and WTPT
A growing literature on “hassles” and “ordeals” explores how
administrative burdens might operate as a rationing device, ensuring
144. On some of the relevant tradeoffs, see generally Memorandum from Jeffrey D. Zients,
Dep. Dir. for Mgmt., & Cass R. Sunstein, Admin., OIRA, to Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies (Nov. 3, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/memoranda/2011/m11-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/56QK-7HCR] (encouraging federal agencies
to share data to improve program implementation while complying with privacy laws).
145. Cf. Stephen M. Gardiner, A Core Precautionary Principle, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 33 (2006)
(discussing the precautionary principle).
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that certain goods go to those who most want or need them.146 The
simple idea is that burdens can improve self-selection. When a movie
or a concert is immensely popular, people might have to stay on the
telephone or wait in line for a ridiculously long time. If that can be
justified, it is because an investment of time, like an expenditure of
money, helps measure how intensely people want things. In the same
vein, seemingly onerous administrative burdens might be a reasonable
way of screening applicants for job training or other programs. If
people are really willing to run the gauntlet, we might have good reason
to think that they will benefit from those programs.
The basic idea here is that it is important to find good ways to
screen those who seek access to scarce resources. In markets, the
willingness-to-pay criterion provides the standard screen; it is meant to
ensure that people will receive goods if and only if they are willing to
pay for them. Willingness to pay money is one way to measure need or
desire; willingness to pay in terms of time and effort (“WTPT,” for
short) is another. It is possible to argue that the willingness-to-pay
criterion discriminates against people without much money, because
willingness to pay is dependent on ability to pay. WTPT does not have
that defect. If anything, it discriminates against people without much
time.
There may or may not be a correlation between lacking money
and lacking time. Government might choose to use WTPT as a way of
targeting—as a way of ensuring that goods are allocated to people who
really need and want them. Note also that if people are willing to pay
others to do a relevant task, such as tax preparation, the difference
between WTP and WTPT might be erased.147

146. Examples include: Albert Nichols & Richard Zeckhauser, Targeting Transfers through
Restrictions on Recipients, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 372 (1982); Vivi Alatas et al., Ordeal Mechanisms
in Targeting: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
19121,
2013),
https://www.nber.org/papers/
w19127.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XFF-QP8E]; Amedeo Fossati & Rosella Levaggi, Public
Expenditure Determination in a Mixed Market for Health Care (May 4, 2004) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=539382 [https://perma.cc/
GF5A-YRY5]; Sarika Gupta, Perils of the Paperwork: The Impact of Information and
Application Assistance on Welfare Program Take-Up in India (Nov. 15, 2017) (unpublished
Ph.D. job market paper, Harvard University Kennedy School of Government),
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/sarikagupta/files/gupta_jmp_11_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4HY3YK4].
147. Note that the IRS provides free online tax preparation to 60 percent of taxpayers. IRS’
Intent to Enter into an Agreement with Free File Alliance, LLC (i.e., Free File Alliance), 67 Fed.
Reg. 67,247 (Nov. 4, 2002). The program is available for free to taxpayers with income less than
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The problem is that sludge is often a singularly crude method of
targeting. A complex, barely comprehensible form for receiving
federal aid is not exactly a reliable way to ensure that people who need
financial help actually get that help. If the goal is to ensure that people
who are eligible for the EITC actually receive it, a degree of sludge is
not the best sorting mechanism. Ordeals have their purposes, and
sludge can be an ordeal. But it is a hazardous mechanism for
targeting—and actually, it is worse than that. In some cases, ordeals
work in concert with the limitations faced by poor people, so as
specifically to select out those with the highest need.148 It is reasonable
to speculate that this particular problem is pervasive. It highlights a
central point here. Paperwork burdens should be assessed for their
distributive effects.149 If they have especially adverse consequences for
the most disadvantaged members of society, there is a serious problem.
E. Acquiring Useful Data
Public officials might impose administrative burdens in order to
acquire data that can be used for multiple purposes, and that might
benefit the public a great deal. For example, officials might want to
know whether people who receive employment training, or some kind
of educational funding, are actually benefiting from the relevant
program. What do they do with that training or that funding?
Administrative burdens might be essential to obtain answers to that
question. Or suppose that the government is trying to reduce the
spread of an infectious disease, to promote highway development, to
monitor hazardous-waste management, to ensure that pilots are
properly certified and that airplanes are properly maintained, or to see
how food-safety programs are working.150 Those who receive
information-collection requests might complain of sludge. But the
relevant burdens might be justified as a means of ensuring acquisition
of important or even indispensable knowledge.

$66,000 annually. Internal Revenue Service, About the Free File Program (Nov. 21, 2018),
https://www.irs.gov/e-file-providers/about-the-free-file-program [https://perma.cc/L5CL-X4ZG].
148. See Gupta, supra note 146, 30–31.
149. See HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, at 6–8.
150. Some of these examples are drawn from OIRA’s Information Collection Dashboard.
Information Collection Review Dashboard, OIRA, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/
jsp/PRA/praDashboard.myjsp?agency_cd=0000&agency_nm=All&reviewType=EX&from_pag
e=index.jsp&sub_index=1 [https://perma.cc/8X7M-9RHE]. For those who are interested in
sludge reduction, or in information collection in general, the Dashboard (typically neglected by
scholars) is worth careful attention.
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In some of these cases, of course, such burdens might be an effort
to ensure program integrity. But I am emphasizing a different point.
Even if program integrity is already guaranteed, officials might seek
information, and require people to provide it, in order to provide both
short-term and long-term benefits. Importantly, that information
might be made public and used by private and public sectors alike.151
In the modern era, acquisition of information might promote public
and private accountability. It might save money. It might spur
innovation. It might even save lives.
These are important justifications for sludge, and they are easy to
overlook. But they should not be taken as a kind of blank check or as
an open invitation for officials to impose significant administrative
burdens. For any particular burden, a central question is whether
government is actually acquiring useful information. If public officials
are asking people to file with paper rather than electronically, refusing
to reuse information that they already have, declining to prepopulate
forms, or requiring quarterly rather than annual reporting, they should
face a significant burden of justification. In all of these cases, they are
likely to run into difficulty in meeting that burden.
In the abstract, it is not possible to say whether sludge can be
justified as a means of generating useful or important information.
Some cases will be easy; any such justification will not be credible.
Other cases will also be easy; any such justification is self-evidently
convincing. Still other cases will be hard; without investigating the
details with care, we cannot know whether such a justification is
sufficient. The only point is that the benefits of sludge might be found
there.
V. SLUDGE REDUCTION AS BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED
DEREGULATION
Return to the number with which I began: 9.78 billion. Insofar as
we are speaking of federal paperwork purposes, that number deserves
serious attention. It is also important to see that there are significant
disparities across agencies, and these give a fuller picture than the
aggregate number:152

151. See DATA.GOV, where the U.S. government provides a great deal of useful information,
much of it emerging from information-collection requests.
152. See INFORMATION COLLECTION BUDGET 2016, supra note 10, at 7.
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Table 1. FY 2015 Paperwork-Burden Hours by Agency (in millions
of hours).
Agency

Burden Hours

Department of the Treasury/Internal Revenue
7357.22
Service (IRS)
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 695.88
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
224.89
Department of Transportation (DOT)
214.21
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
203.39
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
156.89
Department of Labor (DOL)

144.71

Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
Department of Agriculture (USDA)
Department of Education

135.37
127.55
90.84

These numbers provide at least a little help in identifying where
the problem of sludge is most serious and where the greatest
opportunities for sludge reduction can be found. For example, the
Department of the Treasury, and the IRS in particular, wins Olympic
Gold for sludge production. The Department of Education is lowest on
the list, but 90 million hours of annual paperwork burdens impose
serious costs on universities, high schools, and students. From the raw
numbers, of course, we cannot know how much of this burden is
necessary. Perhaps the Department of Agriculture can and should
reduce sludge by 20 percent; perhaps the Department of Health and
Human Services can and should reduce sludge by 10 percent. What can
be done to know, or to help?
One of the distinctive features of that question is that it can appeal
to people who disagree on many political issues. Divisions with respect
to climate change, tax rates for the wealthy, and immigration are
generally irrelevant to the question whether to reduce sludge. To be
sure, we have seen that on some issues, sludge is introduced for
political reasons, and sometimes these are contentious. But a great deal
can be done to reduce sludge without getting close to political divisions.
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A. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, entrusted with
overseeing the PRA, has significant room to maneuver. In any
particular period, it could do a lot or a little to reduce sludge. It can be
relatively lenient with respect to information collection requests, or
not. Its leadership can give a signal of leniency, or not. Because it
assesses such requests on an individual basis, it can work in an ad hoc
manner to reduce the volume of paperwork burdens added each year,
or not.153 Alternatively, OIRA can work more systematically. With its
“data call,” announced every six months, it can direct agencies to
undertake sludge reduction efforts.154 It can issue binding guidance
documents, which can include ambitious targets for burden
reduction.155 It can work with other White House offices, and the
president personally, to produce presidential memoranda or executive
orders.
In fact, OIRA has done all of these things. When I was
Administrator of OIRA in 2012, for example, the Office directed
agencies to do a great deal to reduce paperwork burdens.156 For
example, it called for “significant quantified reductions” in burdens,
with relatively aggressive requirements:
Agencies that now impose high paperwork burdens [defined to
include the Department of Treasury, the Department of Health and
Human Services, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Department of Transportation, the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of
Labor, and the Department of Agriculture] should attempt to identify
at least one initiative, or combination of initiatives, that would
eliminate two million hours or more in annual burden. All agencies
should attempt to identify at least one initiative, or combination of

153. OIRA provides a public account of information-collection requests under review. The
account deserves far more attention, academic and otherwise, than it has received to date. See
Information Collection Review Dashboard, OIRA, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/PRA/
praDashboard.myjsp?agency_cd=0000&agency_nm=All&reviewType=RV&from_page=index.j
sp&sub_index=1 [https://perma.cc/PD5L-9BNJ].
154. See, e.g., Memorandum from Neomi Rao (Aug. 6, 2018), supra note 130 (including a
request that agencies reduce paperwork burdens in a data call); Memorandum from Cass R.
Sunstein (June 22, 2012), supra note 5 (same).
155. Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Admin., OIRA, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts &
Agencies & Indep. Reg. Agencies (Apr. 7, 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/inforeg/PRAPrimer_04072010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D3VWZD8T].
156. See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein (June 22, 2012), supra note 5.
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initiatives, that would eliminate at least 50,000 hours in annual
burden.157

For the executive branch, the choice among the various
procedural vehicles matters in various ways. A presidential directive is
of course the strongest possible statement; if a document comes from
the president of the United States, agencies know that it must be taken
seriously. In contrast, a data call is the weakest,158 and a guidance
document is in the middle. There are also important questions in terms
of the content of any directions. A data call could take the form of an
open-ended standard: “take paperwork burdens seriously” or “reduce
them to the extent feasible.” As in the document quoted above, it could
specify concrete numbers: “eliminate ten million burden-hours per
year” or “cut the existing burden by ten percent.”159 A data call could
specify, and has in the past specified,160 ways to reduce burdens, such
as: (1) use of short-form options, (2) allowing electronic
communication, (3) promoting prepopulation, (4) making less frequent
information collections, or (5) reusing information that the
government already has.161 These are examples of standard
formulations, and they can be enforced with different degrees of
energy. It is also worthwhile to consider novel formulations, which
could be far more aggressive.

157. Id.
158. To illustrate the point, I will violate my ordinary rule against disclosing conversations
with the president of the United States. In a meeting during President Barack Obama’s first term,
we discussed various options for directing agencies to follow certain principles and requirements,
some of them deregulatory. The president decided in favor of a new executive order, which
became Executive Order 13563. I had floated various supplements and alternatives, including a
data call that I would issue. At the end of the meeting, I asked the president what, if anything, to
do with the data call. The president responded, with some combination of pity, mischief, and
incredulity, “Cass, the American people don’t really care that much about your darned data call.”
He might have used some expression other than “darned,” but this is a family law journal.
159. For a mixture of approaches, see Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein (June 22, 2012),
supra note 5.
160. See, e.g., Memorandum from Neomi Rao (Aug. 6, 2018), supra note 130 (suggesting
means for eliminating paperwork-burden hours); Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein (June 22,
2012), supra note 5 (same); Memorandum from Neomi Rao, Admin., OIRA, to Chief Info. Offs.
(July 21, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/MEMORANDUMFOR-CHIEF-INFORMATION-OFFICERS.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PD4-25N7] (same).
161. Memorandum from Neomi Rao (Aug. 6, 2018), supra note 130; see also Memorandum
from Howard Shelanski, Admin., OIRA, and John P. Holdren, Dir., Off. of Sci. & Tech. Pol’y, to
the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies and of the Indep. Reg. Agencies (Sept. 15, 2015)
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/memos/2015/behavioralscience-insights-and-federal-forms.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8MX-9K6C] (recommending the use
of behavioral sciences when crafting initiatives to reduce paperwork-burden hours).
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If we keep the 9.78-billion-hour figure in mind, we might be able
to agree that OIRA should undertake an unprecedently bold effort to
reduce paperwork burdens, with an emphasis on both the flow of new
burdens and the existing stock. For purposes of illustration: with a
presidential directive (preferably) or a directive from OIRA itself (also
good), it could announce an initiative that would require, in the next
six months:
•

Identification of at least three steps to cut existing burdens
through the methods of burden reduction enumerated above.

•

A reduction of existing burdens by least 100,000 hours by all
agencies that impose significant burdens (by some standardized
definition), and a reduction of at least 3 million hours by the
agencies that currently impose the greatest burdens.162

•

A focus on reducing burdens imposed on vulnerable
subpopulations, including the elderly, the disabled, and the poor.

•

A focus on reducing burdens in cases in which those burdens
compromise specified policy priorities, of special interest to the
current administration. (These could of course differ across
administrations and within administrations over time.)

An initiative of this kind could be specified in many different ways.
Interactions between OIRA and relevant agencies could undoubtedly
produce fresh ideas. With respect to policy priorities, different
administrations would make different choices. Some administrations
might want to reduce information-collection burdens under the
Affordable Care Act; others might emphasize sludge imposed on small
businesses and startups; others might emphasize burdens imposed on
the transportation sector or on educational institutions; others might
do all of these. Importantly, many administrative burdens are imposed
by state and local governments. While OIRA has no direct authority
over them, it might use its convening power to remove sludge,
especially where federal, state, and local governments must
coordinate.163

162. See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein (June 22, 2012), supra note 5 (recommending
a reduction of two million burden hours for those agencies imposing the highest burden and a
reduction of fifty thousand burden hours for all other agencies).
163. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY OFF. OF ECON. POL’Y, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS,
DEP’T
OF
LABOR,
OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSING:
A
FRAMEWORK
FOR
POLICYMAKERS (July 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/
licensing_report_final_nonembargo.pdf [https://perma.cc/67Z3-26CV] (demonstrating the power
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B. Courts
There is a lurking question in the background. If the federal
government imposes a paperwork burden in violation of the PRA, is
there a legal remedy? Suppose, for example, that the Department of
Health and Human Services requires hospitals to fill out a host of
confusing or difficult forms. Suppose, too, that the burden is plainly
inconsistent with the PRA, in the sense that it has not been minimized
and has little practical utility. Can hospitals invoke the PRA and seek
invalidation of the requirement?
The answer appears to be negative. The general rule is that so long
as OIRA has approved an information-collection request, people have
to comply with it.164 As the Court of Claims put it, the PRA creates
only “the right of a private citizen not to expend time, effort or financial
resources to respond to an information collection request that has not
been approved by OMB.”165 This holding, followed by many courts,166
is supported by the relevant provision of the PRA, which says:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be
subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of
information that is subject to this subchapter if—
(1) the collection of information does not display a valid control
number assigned by the Director in accordance with this subchapter;
or
(2) the agency fails to inform the person who is to respond to
the collection of information that such person is not required to
respond to the collection of information unless it displays a valid
control number.
(b) The protection provided by this section may be raised in the form
of a complete defense, bar, or otherwise at any time during the agency
administrative process or judicial action applicable thereto.167

of the federal government to convene state and local government officials and recommending
elimination of other forms of sludge).
164. See Pac. Nat. Cellular v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 20, 29 (1998).
165. Id. (emphasis added).
166. Id.; see also Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 744 F.3d 741, 750 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(explaining that the PRA merely provides a defense, not a private cause of action, to those of
whom information is improperly requested); Smith v. United States, 2008 WL 5069783 at *1 (5th
Cir. 2008) (same); Springer v. IRS, 2007 WL 1252475 at *4 (10th Cir. 2007) (same); Sutton v.
Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 844 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); Alegent HealthImmanuel Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 34 F. Supp. 3d 160, 170 (D.D.C. 2014) (same).
167. 44 U.S.C. § 3512(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
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The clear language suggests that the PRA requires only that an
information collection have and display a control number, which shows
that it has been approved by OIRA. There is a good argument that the
PRA should be amended to allow private persons to object more
broadly, perhaps on the ground that OIRA approval was arbitrary or
capricious, given the text of the PRA, at least in cases in which the
information collection is mandatory and in which it exceeds a certain
threshold. The Administrative Procedure Act generally allows judicial
review of arbitrary or capricious decisions by public officials.168 That
standard should be applied to information collections as well, given
their serious cost and intrusiveness.
C. Congress
Should the PRA be amended in other ways? OIRA has
historically been skeptical of the idea, on the ground that even if one
or another amendment would be a good idea, putting the statute in play
in Congress would open the door for other amendments, which may be
uninformed or counterproductive. Nonetheless, some proposals
deserve serious consideration.169 It would make sense for relevant
committees in both the House and the Senate to hold hearings on the
topic. In particular, three reforms would do a great deal to improve the
current situation.
First, Congress should require a periodic “lookback” at existing
paperwork burdens to see if the current “stock” of requirements can
be justified and to eliminate those that seem outmoded, pointless, or
too costly. This reform would build on existing lookback requirements
for regulation in general.170 With respect to paperwork burdens, the
lookback could occur every two years, alongside a requirement of a
publicly available report to Congress. That report could be combined
with the currently required ICB.171
Second, Congress should explicitly require agencies to choose the
least burdensome method for achieving their goals. This is essentially
a requirement of cost-effectiveness. If, for example, annual reporting
168. 42 U.S.C. § 706.
169. See Stuart Shapiro, The Paperwork Reduction Act: Benefits, Costs and Directions for
Reform, 30 GOV’T INFO. Q. 204, 208–09 (2013) (proposing reforms to the PRA to focus on review
of information requests requiring public participation).
170. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Regulatory Lookback, 94 B.U. L. REV. 579, 592–96 (2014)
171. See Information Collection Budget of the United States Government,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-regulatory-affairs/reports/
#ICB [https://perma.cc/SJZ9-PRP9].
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would be as effective as quarterly reporting, then agencies should
choose annual reporting. As we have seen, current law can be
understood to require cost-effectiveness, but an explicit legislative
signal would do considerable good.
Third, Congress should explicitly require the benefits of
paperwork to justify the costs. As we have seen, cost-benefit balancing
can also be seen as required by the PRA in its current form. But the
statute is hardly clear on that point, and again, Congress should give an
explicit signal to this effect.
With respect to paperwork, as with regulation in general, it is
important to appreciate the difference between cost-effectiveness and
cost-benefit analysis.172 The former requires the least costly way of
achieving a specified goal. For that reason, cost-effectiveness is a
modest idea, and it should not be contentious. Who would support a
relatively costly way of achieving a particular goal?173 A burden might
be cost-effective but nonetheless fail cost-benefit analysis—and
therefore be a bad idea. In general, it is important to say that even if a
burden is cost-effective, it should also be assessed in cost-benefit terms
to ensure that it is worthwhile on balance.174
It is true and important that cost-benefit balancing is not always
simple for paperwork burdens. When agencies engage in such
balancing, the general goal is to compare the social benefits and the
social costs, understood in economic terms.175 A paperwork burden
may or may not generate social benefits, understood in those terms.
When the IRS imposes paperwork burdens on taxpayers, it might be
trying to ensure that they do what the law requires. We can speak of
economic costs (in terms, perhaps, of monetized hours)176 and of
172. For a clear account, see STEPHANIE RIEGG CELLINI & JAMES EDWIN KEE, CostEffectiveness and Cost-Benefit Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL PROGRAM EVALUATION
636 (Kathryn E. Newcomer, Harry P. Hatry & Joseph S. Wholey eds., 4th ed. 2015).
173. It is true, however, that paperwork burdens can be seen as a kind of tax, and for some
purposes, a tax should be increased. Consider paperwork burdens imposed on tobacco companies,
as part of a regime of regulation. It is not obviously unreasonable to think that although cost
minimization is generally a good idea, it is not necessarily a good idea if it reduces the equivalent
of a tax imposed on harm-creating activity. Perhaps OIRA should not work especially hard to
minimize paperwork burdens imposed on cigarette companies. This point is not meant to offer a
final conclusion but simply to flag the issue.
174. For an attempt to justify this proposition, but with many qualifications, see generally
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION (2018).
175. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Circular A-4,
Regulatory
Analysis
(Sept.
17,
2003)
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/NCK2-VR9G].
176. See Samaha, supra note 15, at 302.
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economic benefits (in terms, perhaps, of dollars gained by the
Treasury).177 But that is not standard cost-benefit analysis. Or
paperwork might be designed to ensure that people applying for
benefits actually deserve those benefits, as, for example, when the
effort is to avoid giving transfers to people who are not entitled to
them.
In such cases, a crude approach would be to understand the costbenefit justification not as an effort to compare social costs and social
benefits, understood in economic terms, but instead as entailing an
assessment of proportionality. Are significant costs likely to serve
significant purposes? What is the magnitude of the costs,178 and what is
the magnitude of the gains? Real numbers would help inform decisions
and combat excessive burdens. It is worth emphasizing the fact that
even a crude form of cost-benefit analysis would be information
forcing. It would create a stronger incentive for agencies to offer
accurate accounts of the number of burden hours,179 and also to turn
them into monetary equivalents. It would simultaneously create an
incentive for agencies to be more specific, and more quantitative, about
the expected benefits of information collections.
We need far more information about the benefits of collecting
information; in that regard, a requirement of cost-benefit balancing
should help. It should also help to spur improved and perhaps creative
ways to test whether the benefits of information collections justify the
costs.180
D. Sludge Audits
An advantage of the ICB is that it can be seen as a kind of national
Sludge Audit. Covering the entire federal government, it collects
agency-by-agency burdens and aggregates them. It is also highly
visible.
For the moment, let us put its various limitations to one side. Many
institutions should be conducting Sludge Audits. State and local
governments should certainly be doing so. The same is true of a wide

177. For relevant discussion, see generally David Weisbach, Daniel J Hemel & Jennifer Nou,
The Marginal Revenue Rule in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 160 TAX NOTES 1507 (2018).
178. On the importance of testing, see Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein (Aug. 9, 2012),
supra note 5.
179. Id.
180. Weisbach et al., supra note 177, seems to me an important advance, and in some ways it
is quite generalizable.
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assortment of nations in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas.
Transparency about sludge would be the first step toward reducing it.
One of the advantages of Sludge Audits would be to impose a kind of
reality check, increasing the likelihood that burden estimates will not
be unduly optimistic.
My focus here has been on public institutions, but I have noted
that a great deal of sludge comes from private institutions, for better or
for worse.181 Such institutions should be conducting Sludge Audits of
their own. Banks, insurance companies, hospitals, and publishers could
save a great deal of money by reducing sludge, and they could improve
the experience of people who interact with them. It is worth
underscoring the case of hospitals, where sludge can not only create
immense frustration but also impair health and even cost lives.182
CONCLUSION
The idea of deregulation is usually understood as the removal of
formal regulations—those governing the environment, food safety, and
motor vehicles, for example. But administrative burdens are regulatory
in their own way, and they impose a kind of tax. If they require nearly
10 billion hours of paperwork annually, they are imposing, at a
minimum, a cost equivalent to about $200 billion. For both rational
actors and those who display behavioral biases (such as inertia and
present bias), administrative burdens can impose excessive costs,
frustrate enjoyment of rights, and prevent access to important benefits
of multiple sorts. The $200 billion figure greatly understates the actual
impact, economic and psychological. Sludge infringes on the most
fundamental rights; it can also cost lives.
In these circumstances, there is a strong argument for a
behaviorally informed deregulatory effort, aimed particularly at
paperwork burdens. Such an effort would call for reductions at the
level of program design, including radical simplification of existing
requirements and (even better) use of default options to cut learning
and compliance costs. Automatic enrollment can drive administrative
burdens down to zero and have very large effects for that reason.
Where automatic enrollment is not possible, officials might use an
assortment of tools: frequent reminders; simplification and plain

181.
182.

On worse, see AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 25.
For an illustration, see id.
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language; online, telephone, or in-person help; and welcoming
messages to reduce psychological costs.183
What is necessary is a heavily empirical approach to
administrative burdens, including an effort to weigh their benefits
against their costs and a careful assessment of their distributional
effects.184 Are they really helping to reduce fraud? By how much? What
are the take-up rates, and how do they vary across populations,
including the most vulnerable? What are the compliance costs, in terms
of time and money?
To be sure, the answers to these questions will not always be selfevident. If sludge discourages exercise of the abortion right, people will
disagree about whether that is a benefit or a cost. To know whether
sludge causes losses or gains, we will sometimes run into intense
disagreements about values. But in many cases, such disagreements are
uninteresting and irrelevant, and acquisition of the relevant
information will demonstrate that sludge is not worth the candle. In the
future, it should be a high priority for deregulation and deregulators,
for one simple reason: its benefits cannot possibly justify its costs.
Time is the most precious commodity that human beings have.
Public officials should find ways to give them more of it.

183.
184.

See HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 21, for a valuable discussion.
See id.

